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COMMENTS
FAIR SErLEMENT AND THE NON-SETING DEFENDANT: IN RE
MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS PENSION PLAN AND IRAP LITIGATION
It is axiomatic that most litigation settles rather then going to
trial. In fact, courts have traditionally favored settlement.2 How-
ever, in the context of complex litigation,3 it may be possible to
effectuate only a partial settlement, often as a result of the differ-
ig degrees of culpability of the multiple defendants. For example,
if the non-settling defendants have a right of contribution against
the settling defendant,4 the settling defendant's incentive to settle
may be diminished because he achieves no finality through settle-
ment. For this reason (and under controlled circumstances), a court
may be willing to extinguish the non-settling defendant's right of
1. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. Complex litigation is not a term of art. However, this comment uses the term to
characterize cases with complex procedural issues, generally involving multiple plaintiffs,
often as members of one or more classes; multiple defendants, usually with a wide range
of culpability; and many claims and counterclaims, frequently necessitating consolidation of
actions from several jurisdictions. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LirrGATION § 20.12 (2d ed.
1985) (for a discussion regarding the benefits of having one judge preside over complex
litigation). For another "definition" of the term complex litigation, see AMERICAN LAW
INsTrrrT, COMPLEX LrIGATION PRo=wr 11 (Tent. Draft No. 1 Apr. 14, 1989) (exclu-
sively defining complex litigation as "multiparty, multiforum litigation").
4. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of contribution.
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contribution with a bar order.5 However, many courts are coming
to realize that the non-settling defendant must be offered some sort
of procedural protection, such as a fairness hearing or future judg-
ment reduction, to compensate for this lost right.6 How to achieve
the judicial system's goals of compensation and deterrence, while
balancing concerns about fairness to the defendant in this situation,
has posed a difficult question for the courts.
A court asked to approve a partial settlement may consider a
number of questions in analyzing the proposed settlement. A pri-
mary question is whether the settlement compensates the plaintiffs.
At least in the eyes of a court, the question of whether the settle-
ment terms are fair to the non-settling defendants is a secondary
one. In addition, as a corollary, the court must decide what stan-
dard should be used to judge the fairness of the settlement terms
and how to weigh the competing interests of the plaintiffs, the
settling defendants, and the non-settling defendants.
The Second Circuit recently confronted these competing con-
cerns in In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP
Litigation.7 In that case, the court directly faced the issue of a
contribution bar order with a judgment reduction provision when a
non-settling defendant appealed from the district court's approval of
a partial settlement. The district court had provided for a judgment
reduction to compensate the non-settling defendant for the contribu-
tion bar; however the Second Circuit found the method to be in
error and reversed. Although the issue had previously been ad-
dressed, with a divergence of opinion, in the areas of admiralty
and securities law, the Second Circuit decision was the first case
regarding settlement bar orders and judgment reduction methods in
the ERISA area.
This comment begins with a review of the policies underlying
settlement, contribution rights and judgment reduction methods.9
The availability of the right of contribution and its impact on the
settlement process are discussed.' ° Settlement bar orders and the
three methods of judgment reduction are described." Furthermore,
5. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
7. Cullen v. Riley (In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig.), 957
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter "Masters").
8. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
9. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
1450 [Vol. 43:1449
IN RE MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS
contemporaneous developments in admiralty and securities law and
under ERISA are reviewed, noting that courts have fashioned rules
considering both the policies of those areas of the law and the
competing interests of all the parties to the litigation. 2
Next, the Masters litigation is discussed. The complex history
of this litigation is reviewed, illustrating the varying degrees of
culpability of the parties involved.1 3 The partial settlement ap-
proved by Judge Broderick of the Southern District of New York
is described, with emphasis on how the plans' insurers would cover
the liabilities of the trustees, including the non-settling defendant.14
The Second Circuit's analysis of that settlement and the faults it
detected are detailed, culminating in a description of the settlement
policy the court announced.'5
Finally, the Second Circuit's decision is analyzed, concluding
that the Second Circuit's reversal of the settlement was correct
because the district court's settlement left the non-settling defendant
with potential liability far exceeding his culpability. 6 In so hold-
ing, the Second Circuit announced that in order for a right of
contribution to be barred, the settlement must be fair to the non-
settling defendant. The court's fairness standard is examined, and
the method is found to be flawed in several respects. First, the
method is not sufficiently clear so that it may be easily applied in
future cases. Nor does the method adequately answer the questions
of compensation, fairness and deterrence raised by judgment reduc-
tion provisions. Finally, this comment concludes that the Second
Circuit's decision does not appropriately balance the policies of the
ERISA statutes and the policies of settlement.
I. PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS, CONTRBUTION BAR ORDERS AND
JUDGMENT REDUCTION METHODS
The settlement of complex litigation before trial is generally
favored by the federal courts.'7 Complex cases can and do drag
12. See infra notes 56-110 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 138-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
17. See Wald v. Wolfson (In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig.), 967 F.2d 489, 493 (lth Cir.
1992) (stating, "Public policy strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action law-
suits .... Accordingly the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize district courts to
facilitate settlements in all types of litigation ... " and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a))
(hereinafter "U.S 0W'). See also FEr. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note ("[P]ublic
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on for years; they crowd the dockets and deplete the parties' and
courts' resources.s Therefore, for efficiency reasons and in order
to provide meaningful relief, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorize the district courts to facilitate settlements'9 and, in fact,
a majority of suits do settle before trial."° This is because settle-
ment offers the plaintiff relief from the uncertainty of litigation; the
settlement may provide a "war chest" for ongoing litigation; and
the present value of the settlement may be greater than a recovery
later.21 For the defendant, in addition to relief from the litigative
uncertainty, and cost of maintaining the litigation, settlement also
offers privacy and avoidance of an admission of guilt.'
A. The Availability of Contribution and the Incentive to Settle
Typically, the decision to settle and the terms thereof rest
wholly within the discretion of the parties and the judicial system
does not play any role in those issues.' However, certain settle-
ments, such as class actions' and shareholder derivative suits,"
require judicial approval; further, in some situations parties are
unwilling to dismiss litigation unless the court agrees to invoke its
equitable enforcement powers.26 In the usual case the standard for
policy favor[s] the compromise and settlement of disputes."). See also infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
18. U.S. Oil, 967 F.2d at 493.
19. Id See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (c); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee note
("Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the litigants
and the judicial system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litiga-
tion as possible."). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) states only that "[a] class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court." The courts have formulated
the standard that a class action settlement must be "fair, adequate and reasonable" to the
parties to the settlement and any third parties who could be affected. See, e.g., Williams
v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting a heightened
standard in a Title VII consent decree case).
20. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder De-
rivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 544-47 (1980) (noting that in a
study of 53 lawsuits involving corporations, 70.7% were settled). See also Janet C. Al-
exander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STANFORD L. REV. 497, 498 (1991) (noting that less than five percent of civil disputes
actually proceed to judgment).
21. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp. (In re Kaypro Corp. Shareholder Litig.), 884 F.2d 1222,
1225 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 489
U.S. 890 (1990) (hereinafter "Kaypro.").
22. Jones, supra note 20, at 444.
23. Masters, 957 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
25. FaD. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
26. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1025.
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judicial approval of a settlement is the "fairness, reasonableness
and adequacy of the settlement" to the plaintiffs.
z7
Where the rights of third parties are affected, however,
their interests too must be considered. In other words,
where the rights of one who is not a party to a settlement
are at stake the fairness of the settlement to the settling
parties is not enough to earn the judicial stamp of approv-
al.n
Thus, in suits involving multiple defendants, obtaining a settle-
ment can be quite complex because of the court's involvement 9
and because the parties' incentives to settle may be skewed based
on the defendants' ability to recover from each other. Historically,
the common law doctrine of joint and several liability favored full
compensation of the victim, and ignored the relative culpability of
the defendants." A victim was allowed to collect the entire
amount of her damages from any of the defendants. Since the rela-
tive wrongdoing of each defendant was irrelevant, a right to contri-
bution was barred. In other words, one defendant was not allowed
to recover any reimbursement from the others. However, a right
to indemnity, i.e., shifting the entire amount of the damages pay-
ment, did exist at common law."
Most states33 and most commentatorse4 have rejected the
common law's per se bar against contribution among defendants.
However, if a right to contribution exists, a defendant's incentive
to settle may be diminished. For example, if the judgment against
a non-settling defendant exceeded his proportionate fault, then he
would seek payment of the excess amount of the judgment in a
separate suit for contribution against the settling defendant. If this
happens the finality the settling defendant thought he had achieved
27. Id. at 1025-26.
28. Id. at 1026 (citations omitted).
29. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 489 U.S. 890 (1990).
30. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at
336-38 (5th ed. 1984).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 51.
33. Most states have adopted statutes which to some extent allow contribution among
tortfeasors. Id § 50, at 338.
34. Id § 50. See also Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985)
C'mhe common law's rejection of contribution among joint tortfeasors has itself been
rejected by most states and most commentators.").
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through settlement was illusory. This disincentive to settle caused
by a right of contribution is particularly strofng in complex litiga-
tion, where a huge cast of defendants may have dramatically differ-
ent levels of culpability and the plaintiffs' damages can be astro-
nomical. 5
B. Settlement Bar Orders and Judgment Reduction
To reduce the disincentive to settle, some courts have been
willing to include a contribution bar as part of the settlement.'
"In essence, a bar order constitutes a final discharge of all obliga-
tions of the settling defendants and bars any further litigatiop of
claims made by non[-]settling defendants against settling defen-
dants."37 In other words, the right of one defendant to seek con-
tribution from another is cut off. However, because an out-and-out
contribution bar maybe unfair to the non-settling defendants, some
jurisdictions permit judgment reduction. 3' A judgment reduction,
or credit rule, is a means by which any judgment against the non-
settling defendant is to be reduced in light of the settlement with
the other defendants. Courts have used three methods for reducing
settlements: pro rata, proportionate fault, and pro tanto.39
35. As one court noted, "Anyone foolish enough to settle without barring contribution
is courting disaster." In re Nucorp Energy Secur. Litig., 661 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D.
Cal. 1987).
36. U.S. Oil, 967 F.2d 489, 494 (lth Cir. 1992). The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Modem class action settlements increasingly incorporate settlement bar
orders such as the one at issue in this case. The reason for this trend is that
bar orders play an integral role in facilitating settlement. Defendants buy little
peace through settlement unless they are assured that they will be protected
against codefendants' efforts to shift their losses through cross-claims for indem-
nity, contribution, and other causes relating to the underlying litigation. ... In
short, settlement bar orders allow settling parties to put a limit on the risks of
settlement.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nor. Franklin v.
Peat Marwick Main. & Co., 489 U.S. 890 (1990).
38. See infra notes 60-63, 69-99 and accompanying text (discussing different courts'
approaches to judgment reduction).
39. Kovacs v. Ernst & Young (In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig.), 927 F.2d 155, 160-61 n.3
(4th Cir. 1991) (hereinafter "Jiffy Lube"). The 1939 Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
sets out pro rata rules; the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 885, 886A, 886B (1965) adopt pro tanto rules; and the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977) uses proportionate fault. See Thomas V. Harris,
Washington's Unique Approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The Modified Pro Tanto Cred-
it and The Reasonableness Hearing Requirement, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 69, 77 (1984/85). A
full discussion of state law regarding contribution and judgment reduction rules is beyond
the scope of this comment.
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Under the pro rata method of judgment reduction, the relative
culpability of the defendants is irrelevant.' The court simply ap-
portions equal shares of the liability to all the defendants; 41 e.g.,
four defendants are each one quarter liable. Thus, if a plaintiff
settles with three of four defendants, a judgment against the non-
settling defendant is reduced by three quarters, regardless of the
actual liability of the settling defendants. Particularly in cases
where there are a large number of defendants, this method of judg-
ment reduction diminishes the plaintiffs willingness to reach even
a partial settlement.4 A plaintiff that can achieve a judgment
against all the defendants will get a larger recovery than if he
partially settles, achieves a judgment against the remaining defen-
dants, and then has that judgment reduced away. Equally, non-
settling defendants whose culpability is slight find this method less
attractive because they are deprived of a strong right of contribu-
tion and instead receive a judgment reduction of potentially lesser
value.43
In contrast, the relative culpability of the defendants is highly
relevant in the proportionate fault method of judgment reduction. 44
The relative fault of all the defendants, both settling and non-set-
tling, is considered, and the judgment against the non-settling de-
fendants is reduced by a percentage corresponding to the cumula-
tive degree of fault of the settling defendants.45 Theoretically, this
method is appealing because it seems the defendants pay the victim
Unfortunately, the distinctions between these methods are made more confusing by
courts which mislabel the methods. For example, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit
characterized the pro rata approach as one "under which the non-settling [defendant]
receives a credit based upon the percentage of the settling party's fault. Id. at 1578. As
the following discussion demonstrates, this is actually the proportionate fault method of
judgment reduction. See infra notes 44-46.
40. Jiffy Lube, 927 F.2d at 161 n.3.
41. Il
42. Miller v. Apartments and Homes of New Jersey, 646 F.2d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 1981)
(in a comparison of pro tanto and pro rata credit, the former is "plainly preferable" to
encourage settlement because the rule that the plaintiff must give non-settling defendants
the benefit of pro rata reduction in their liability impedes settlement).
43. William B. Davis, Note, Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good Faith Con-
tribution Bar, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1253, 1258 n.53 (1991) (settling defendants do not know
if they remain liable until the case is over and the settlement is compared to the pro rata
share. If settling defendants have satisfied their debt to plaintiffs, the non-settling defen-
dants may have to pay more than their pro rata share if the judgment is greater than the
settlement.
44. ld. at 160-61 n.3.
45. 1d at 160 n.3.
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in proportion to their actual liability. In practice, however, a num-
ber of troublesome problems arise. First, a holdout defendant can
stall the settlement because the plaintiff bears the risk of a bad
settlement. Moreover, it is hard for the plaintiffs in a class action
to determine the worthiness of a proposed settlement because the
amount of the setoff is not determined until after the trial.' Fur-
thermore, the factfinder bears the heavy burden of determining
relative fault. Taken together, this obviates much of the policy
underlying the judicial enthusiasm for settlement.
Finally, the pro tanto method of judgment reduction reduces
the judgment against the non-settling defendant by the amount of
the settlement paid by the settling defendants.47 Thus, if the three
defendants settled for $1 million, and a judgment of $25 million
was rendered against the fourth defendant, the $25 million would
be reduced to $24 million. If the fourth defendant was only mini-
mally culpable, he has paid dearly for the loss of his right of
contribution, and the settling defendants have gotten away very
cheaply. The opportunity to get away cheaply encourages collusion
between plaintiffs and favored defendants.4" Because of this possi-
bility some jurisdictions require a hearing to show good faith and
to discuss relative culpability.49 A protracted fairness hearing
46. Id. at 161 n.3.
The timing of the decision regarding the judgment reduction method has itself been
a subject for litigation. See Jiffy Lube, 927 F.2d 155, 157 (4th Cir. 1991) (characterizing
the issue as "whether . . a partial settlement between plaintiffs and most defendants
which grants the non-settling defendants a right of setoff, in exchange for [a contribution
bar], may be approved when the settlement agreement provides that the method for cal-
culating that setoff will not be determined until . . . judgment" and holding that this
situation constituted prejudice to both plaintiffs and non-settling defendants); In re Granada
Partnership See. Litig., 803 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that the set
off method must be determined upon approval of the settlement and adopting the propor-
tionate fault method); In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1368 (2d Cir.
1991) (characterizing the second issue as "whether the method of judgment reduction must
be determined" upon approval of the settlement and holding that it did not).
47. Jiffy Lube, 927 F.2d at 160 n.3.
48. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 489 U.S. 890 (1990). See also M. Patricia Adanski, Con-
tribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 66 IOwA L. REV. 533,
549 (1981) (stating that the pro tanto approach leads to collusion "since the plaintiff -
who will be able to collect total damages less the settlement amount from the remaining
defendants - theoretically has nothing to lose by accepting an inadequate sum in settle-
ment").
49. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1230; Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir.
1985); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D.
Mass. 1988).
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wherein the non-settling defendant protests the pro tanto method
defeats the very purpose of settlement, i.e., cost reduction and effi-
ciency." In effect, the fairness hearing essentially converts the pro
tanto method into a modified proportionate fault method of judg-
ment reduction.
As one commentator has noted, the decision whether to reduce
the judgment against the non-settling defendant by the pro tanto or
proportionate fault method is essentially a question of who bears
the risk of a bad settlement - the settling plaintiff or the non-
settling defendant.5' Under the proportionate fault rule, the risk of
an inadequate settlement is placed on the plaintiff, the party best
able to evaluate the settlement.5 2 On the other hand, the pro tanto
rule places the risk on the non-settling defendant, the party who
did not participate in the settlement. 3 Most courts have deter-
mined that although the policy of promoting settlements is fur-
thered by the pro tanto method, the policy of promoting fundamen-
tal fairness to litigants must prevail.' "Ultimately the role of the
judiciary and the trial process is to fairly assess culpability in
determining the outcome of litigation."5 Courts that have rejected
the pro tanto method in favor of proportionate fault reduction
persuasively argue that the proportionate fault method best matches
the equitable nature of contribution as well as the policies of deter-
rence and compensation. Thus, for this reason the majority of
courts prefer the proportionate fault method of judgment reduction
over the pro tanto method.
C. Judgment Reduction Under Admiralty, Securities and ERISA
Laws
Decisions in the areas of admiralty, securities and ERISA laws
provide some insight into how courts have determined the appropri-
ateness of a judgment reduction method for the non-settling defen-
50. Dianne M. Hansen, Note, The Effect of Partial Settlements on the Rights of Non-
Settling Defendants in Federal Securities Class Actions: In Search of a Standardized Uni-
form Contribution Bar Rule, 60 UMKC L. REv. 91, 104 (1991).
51. See id, at 106.
52. Jiffy Lube, 927 F.2d at 161.
53. Id.
54. See Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 553 (D. Colo. 1989)
("the pro tanto rule, while promoting expedient settlements, does so at the expense of eq-
uitable considerations"); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Patroit's Point Dev. Auth.,
772 F. Supp. 1565, 1575 (D.S.C. 1991) (hereinafter "USF&G").
55. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp at 553.
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dant whose right to contribution has been barred. Typically, a three
stage analysis is employed. At the first stage, the court assesses the
existence of a right of contribution, usually by considering the
policies underlying that area of law or statute.56 Next, the court
determines whether the defendant's right to contribution may be
barred. If the court determines the right is extinguishable, then the
court provides for a method of judgment reduction in order to
compensate the defendant for his lost right. Of course, the three
stage analysis is generally made in a series of decisions, rather
than in a single case.
In admiralty, the traditional maritime rule provides that a
wrongdoer who has paid more than his share of the damages can
seek contribution from the other wrongdoers." Two admiralty cas-
es decided before the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the injured
party who obtained a judgment against joint tortfeasors to satisfy
the full amount of the judgment from any tortfeasor, regardless of
their comparative fault.58 These cases do not, however, address the
issue of the non-settling defendants' right to contribution where a
settlement and bar order have been effectuated. This has created
widely disparate authority.59 For example, although the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a pro tanto method in Self v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co.,'e the most recent decision from that court sought to
56. See, e.g., USF&G, 772 F. Supp. at 1572 ("The Court's analysis necessarily begins
with the public policies that underlie Rule lOb-5.").
57. Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied sub nom., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Chevron Transport Co., 486
U.S. 1033 (1988).
58. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) and Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979). Prior to Reliable Transfer,
admiralty law followed the principle of divided damages, where damages were divided
equally between the parties involved in a collision or stranding regardless of fault. Reli-
able Transfer referred to the more modem principles of comparative negligence to allocate
damages based on proportionate fault. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 410-11. In Edmonds,
a longshoreman's injuries were caused by the stevedore employer and the shipowner. The
Supreme Court rejected an argument that the shipowner's liability for damages should be
limited to its proportionate fault, and allowed the longshoreman to collect all of his dam-
ages from the shipowner under the traditional principle of joint and several liability.
Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 266. However, the shipowner had a right of contribution against
the stevedore employer, and in that fashion, damages would ultimately be apportioned
according to fault. Id. at 269.
59. See Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that it "sym-
pathize[d] with the district court's difficulties in finding guidance from controlling authori-
ty on the settlement bar issue [because] [t]here is none").
60. Self, 832 F.2d at 1548 (following Edmonds and noting the need to provide "special
protection" to seamen).
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preserve the principle of comparative fault by rejecting a settlement
bar rule that would cut off the non-settling defendant's right of
contribution.6 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has followed the pro-
portional fault approach of United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
so that the liability of any non-settling defendants is limited to the
share of damages caused by their proportional fault.62 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit has allowed the non-settling defendant's right of
contribution to be barred where the settlement was made in good
faith, maldng a finding of good faith based on the settlement's pro-
portionality to the settling defendant's liability.' As can be seen
from this body of case law, even though the substantive law of
admiralty has recognized the principle of comparative fault, it has
not yet decisively concluded which judgment reduction method best
suits its objectives.
The federal courts have also grappled with the issue of contri-
bution bar orders and corresponding judgment reduction methods in
securities litigation. An express statutory right of contribution
among defendants found jointly and severally liable exists in cer-
tain securities actions.' Moreover, an implied right has been
found under Rule lOb-5' promulgated under section 10(b)l of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67 However, having deter-
mined that the right of contribution exists, some courts have been
willing to extinguish that right with a settlement bar order.' The
61. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575,
1584 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that Great Lakes was not barred from seeking contribution
from a settling defendant for settlement payments to Self, in a case related to Self v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron Transport Corp. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992).
62. Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir. 1979). For
sources advocating the Leger approach see Evan T. Caffrey, Note, Holding the Bag -
Proportional Fault and the Non-Settling Defendant: Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 14 TuL. MAR. Li. 415, 421-422 (1990); Marie R. Yeates et al., Contribution and
Indemnity in Maritime Litigation, 30 S. TEx. LJ. 215, 244-49 (1989).
63. Miller, 887 F.2d at 907.
64. Sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide for con-
tribution. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1988). Subsection 11(f) of the Securities Act of
1933 provides for the same. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988).
65. 17 C.F.R. 240.I0b-5 (1992).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
67. See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 489 U.S. 890 (1990) ('[N]or do we think Congress intended
the right to contribution to be inextinguishable"). See U.S. Oil, 967 F.2d 489, 496 (11th
Cir. 1992) (extinguishing right of defendant who had full opportunity .to preserve its
rights).
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courts that have considered the question are divided over the ap-
propriate judgment reduction method to use. Some courts have
adopted a proportionate fault method, concluding that method best
satisfies the statutory, equitable and policy goals underlying the
federal securities laws. 9 The Ninth Circuit described three policies
at work in a Rule lOb-5 action: "the statutory goal of punishing
each wrongdoer, the equitable goal of limiting liability to relative
culpability, and the public policy goal of encouraging settle-
ments."'" These policies, although difficult to satisfy simultaneous-
ly, "are best achieved if the credit method reflects the same objec-
tives as the contribution claim which it replaces."7 The propor-
tionate fault method punishes each wrongdoer and provides for de-
terrence because the "most culpable parties bear the consequences
of their actions." '72 Thus, these courts argue the equitable princi-
ples underlying contribution are served when liability is appor-
tioned according to fault because the non-settling defendant pays
only his share of a future judgment. 3 Furthermore, settlements are
encouraged because the settling defendant knows the non-settling
defendant cannot sue for contribution, but the non-settling defen-
dant has been compensated for this lost right.
The courts that have adopted the pro tanto method argue that
these same principles are achieved by holding a hearing in which
the fairness of the settlement to the non-settling defendants is con-
sidered. To determine fairness the court considers such factors as
the probability of collecting a larger judgment, the strength of
plaintiff's case, the relative culpability of all the defendants, and
the extent of the court's participation in the settlement process.74
A critical problem with the use of the fairness hearing is that two
of these factors, the strength of plaintiff's case and relative culpa-
bility, can only be adequately assessed when discovery is complet-
ed and the case is near trial.75 In fact, the fairness hearing de-
69. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1231; USF&G, 772 F. Supp. 1565, 1572-75' (D.S.C. 1991);
Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 553 (D. Colo. 1989); In re Sunrise
Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
70. Kaypro, 884 F.2d at 1231.
71. USF&G, 772 F. Supp. at 1573.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D.
Mass. 1988).
75. USF&G, 772 F. Supp. at 1573. Most courts adopting the pro tanto method do so
when discovery is near completion. See, e.g., Westheimer v. Finesod (In re Terra-Drill
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volves into a mini-trial.76 Such a mini-trial negates many of the
benefits of settling.
Furthermore, other problems with the pro tanto method have
been noted. The method provides incentives for the plaintiff to
collude with certain defendants. Specifically, further litigation
can be funded if the plaintiff accepts a low partial settlement, and
the amount of the total recovery possible is not diminished.79 Low
settlement with those defendants with limited resources forces
wealthier defendants to pay more than if all defendants went to
trial.' The Ninth Circuit has expressed skepticism that a good
faith hearing could resolve these problems."' In fact, it has been
argued that the pro tanto method may actually encourage such
"bad" settlements, i.e., those "in which a defendant settles for less
than his likely share of liability at trial."'  In this way the poten-
tial may be for litigation to be prolonged, thereby reducing judicial
efficiency.'
Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co." is most often cited in sup-
port of the pro tanto judgment reduction methodY However, the
Singer case does not involve a bar order, and therefore does not
discuss the "policy question of what credit method would be re-
quired to compensate the non-settling defendant for the barring of
his equitable right to contribution."86 More correctly, Singer can
be cited as support that the Second Circuit applies "the one satis-
faction rule, which provides that a plaintiff is entitled to only one
satisfaction for each injury."" In Singer, the plaintiff brought
Partnerships Sec. Litig.), 726 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (adopting pro tanto rule after
trial of non-settling defendants); Dalton v. Alston & Bird, 741 F. Supp. 157, 158, 160
(S.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that discovery had been completed and time for all substantive
motions expired before adopting the pro tanto rule).
76. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985).
77. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nor. Franklin v.





82. In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
83. USF&G, 772 F. Supp. 1565, 1575 (D.S.C. 1991).
84. 878 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Jify Lube, 927 F.2d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 1991). See also infra note 97.
86. USF&G, 772 F. Supp. at 1571.
87. Singer, 878 F.2d at 600. For example, [t]he Second Circuit paints this scenario:
[Pilaintiffs settle with some defendants for a large sum, at trial the non[-]set-
fling defendants are found to be primarily responsible for the damage and are
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nearly identical actions against Loeb Rhoades and Olympia Brew-
ing under federal securities laws for the same injury.8 Two weeks
after a verdict was rendered against Olympia, the plaintiff obtained
a $1.25 million settlement from Loeb Rhoades. 9 Olympia then
obtained a setoff of the judgment against it by the amount of the
settlement with Loeb Rhoades. 9 The Second Circuit determined
that because the settlement and the judgment represented common
damages for the same injury, the non-settling defendant Olympia
was entitled to the setoff.9'
In analyzing the Singer decision, the Second Circuit in Masters
noted that Singer had not addressed the question of whether the
non-settling defendants could seek contribution in excess of the
amount of the judgment reduction, i.e., the amount of the settle-
ment.' Nothing in Singer would prevent such a reduction even if
the settlement exceeded the settling defendant's proportionate liabil-
ity. 93 The court noted that if the contrary were true, "then a plain-
tiff could maximize his total recovery by proving that a party who
made the largest contribution to a settlement was the party least at
fault.'
Subsequent to Singer, in In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litiga-
tion,95 the Second Circuit refused to specify a method of judgment
reduction. 96 At issue in that case was whether the adoption of the
method of judgment reduction could be deferred until a judgment
was reached; the Second Circuit allowed the parties to defer that
decision.' In dictum, the court noted that contribution bars were
required to pay a large sum, and plaintiffs end up with more money than they
would have received if all parties had gone to trial.
Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 599.
89. aid
90. Id.
91. Id. at 600.
92. Masters, 957 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. Id.
94. d.
95. 948 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1991).
96. Boesky cites Singer as authority for the Second Circuit's adoption of the pro tanto
method. Boesky, 948 F.2d at 1362.
97. Id. at 1369. The court notes that its decision was in part a function of the fact
that none of the parties objected to deferral. In cases where the non-settling defendant has
objected to deferral, the courts have determined that the method must be specified before
the settlement is approved because the judgment reduction method affects settlement and
trial strategy. See also supra note 46 (citing Boesky for the foregoing proposition and
citing two other cases holding that the decision regarding the method of judgment reduc-
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desirable because they facilitated settlement.98 Later, the Masters
court firmly stated that although it had not adopted a judgment
reduction method in Boesky, "in no way did [it] intimate that [it]
later would approve a method . . . that did not conform to Sing-
er."99 Exactly what the court meant by this remains to be seen.
Prior to Masters, only the Seventh Circuit had considered the
issue of a contribution bar order in the context of ERISA law. In
Donovan v. Robins," the Seventh Circuit followed the same sort
of analysis as that found in securities law. First, the court deter-
mined that a right of contribution was available under ERISA. 0'
Second, utilizing the lessons of admiralty and securities laws,"
the court declined to permit the non-settling defendants' rights of
contribution to be extinguished by a settlement bar. 3 And final-
ly, the court announced its adoption of the proportional fault rule,
which would provide a "neat solution" to the problems encountered
in encouraging settlements."°
A vigorous concurrence critiqued the majority's adoption of the
proportional fault rule as inconsistent with the policies underlying
the ERISA statutes. The "history of ERISA," wrote Judge Coffey,
"demonstrates that Congress intended to codify the principles of
trust law."'0" Trust law permits equitable contribution among co-
trustees' 06 - i.e., liability is joint and several."o According to
Judge Coffey, Congress intentionally adopted joint and several
liability so that an ERISA plaintiff could recover the full amount
of damages from any of the breaching trustees.0 8 And, under the
tion must be determined upon approval of the settlement).
98. Boesky, 948 F.2d at 1369 ("The settling defendants' motive to compromise would
have been severely diminished if they were compelled to remain derivatively liable for
sums later paid to the plaintiffs by non[-]settling defendants.").
99. Masters, 957 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1992).
100. 752 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1984). The reason why the analysis in ERISA cases may
be considered analogous but not identical to that in securities and admiralty law is that
ERISA statutorily provides for complete federal authority, and thus, is governed by federal
common law. Masters, 957 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1992).
101. Donovan, 752 F.2d at 1178. The Second Circuit explicitly agreed with this deter-
mination in Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank, 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1991),
through an examination of "traditional trust law and equity jurisprudence"
102. Donovan, 752 F.2d at 1180.
103. IL at 1181.
104. aIL
105. Id. at 1184 (Coffey, J., concurring).
106. IL
107. 1L at 1185.
108. ld.
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principles of joint and several liability, the full amount of the
recovery would be reduced by the amount of any settlement with
one or more of the breaching trustees."° Therefore, Judge Coffey
believed the majority's proportional fault rule was inappropriate
because the rule does not ensure the ERISA plaintiff will be fully
compensated as Congress intended."'
From this review of the decisions concerning judgment reduc-
tion in various areas of the law and in different jurisdictions, it is
clear that no one method has prevailed. Therefore, it was that
question which was addressed in Masters.
II. THE MASTERS, MATES & PILOTS PENSION PLAN AND IRAP
LITIGATION
A. The History of the Litigation
In 1983, the trustees of the Masters, Mates & Pilots' Pension
Plans and Individual Retirement Income Plan ("IRAP") (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "plans")... selected Tower Asset
Management, Inc. as the investment manager for $15 million of
TRAP assets."' Additional plan assets were entrusted to Tower
Asset so that by November 1985 Tower Asset was managing ap-
proximately $30 million of the plans' assets.113 During this time,
Tower Asset invested the plans' assets in numerous risky ventures,
mainly involving companies in the maritime industry."4 These
companies generally had little or no capital and extremely high
debt ratios."5 Many of these entities had arrangements to raise
capital with Tower Capital Corporation and Tower Securities,
Inc."6 As the similarity of the names suggests, the three corpora-
tions were closely related. The three individual defendants involved
in the suit served as the officers and directors of each corporation
and cumulatively owned 100% respectively of each corporation." 7
109. Id. at 1186.
110. Id.
111. The IRAP was an individual account or defined contribution plan within the mean-
ing of ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988). The Pension Plan was a defined
benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988). Id




116. Id These arrangements are described in exhaustive detail in Lowen v. Tower Asset
Management Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
117. Id.
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In fact, there was evidence that these defendants actually owned
substantial equity interests in the maritime companies in which the
plans' assets were invested."1
When it was discovered that the value of the plans' assets had
declined drastically, Tower Asset was dismissed as the investment
manager;1 9 litigation ensued in December 1985.'"
Based on the extensive documentation of these transactions
provided by the plaintiffs, the district court judge had little difficul-
ty finding that the Tower corporations and the named individuals
violated the prohibited transactions provisions of ERISA." Spe-
cifically, the investments made by Tower Asset violated ERISA
sections 406(b)(1) and 406(b)(3)." To reach this decision, the
judge determined that the Tower corporations were fiduciaries
within the meaning of ERISA." Additionally, the "close and in-
timate relationship between the corporate and individual defen-
dants" allowed the corporate veil to be pierced, so that all the
defendants, corporate and individual, were held jointly and several-
ly liable.24 After a de novo review, the Second Circuit affirmed
118. Id.
119. Id. By early 1986 the plans' assets had declined from $30 million to $9.5 million.
Id.
120. Id. The litigation was made more complex by the number of related actions. The
Secretary of Labor brought a similar action not only against the Tower corporations and
their owners, but also against the trustees of the plans who had initially selected Tower
Asset as the plans' investment manager. The Secretary also sued the plans themselves.
Moreover, his motion to intervene in the above-described litigation was granted by the
district court, Additional litigation ensued when the plans' participants sued the trustees
for breaching their fiduciary duties by selecting and monitoring Tower Asset as the plans'
investment manager. Finally, the plans' attorneys and auditors were sued for malpractice,
and the plans' custodial trustee, a bank, was also charged with ERISA violations. The
actions that were consolidated before the district court include the Secretary of Labor's
action against the trustees and the Tower defendants, the participants' consolidated class
actions against the trustees and Tower, the participants' class action against the plans'
former counsel, and the trustees' actions against the custodial trustee. Three actions against
the former accountants were not consolidated. Masters, 957 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir.
1992). For an additional description of the litigation see Cerisse Anderson, Judge Removes
Proskauer Over Fund Conflict, N.Y..., Jan. 26, 1990, at 1.
121. Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1542, 1554 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
122. Id. Section 406(b) prohibits a fiduciary from dealing "with the assets of the plan
in his own interest or for his own account" (§ 406(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)) or
from receiving "any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing
with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan." (§
406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3)). Lowen, 653 F. Supp at 1553.
123. Lowen, 653 F. Supp. at 1551.
124. Id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the district court's ruling, and required the defendants to disgorge
about $1 million in fees and other consideration received for the
improper investments."as
B. The Settlement
In October of 1991 the district court approved a settlement that
allowed the participants to recoup about $22 million of the loss
suffered by the plans.'26 The settling parties included the follow-
ing defendants: the plans' trustees, the law firms, the auditors, and
the custodial trustee. In exchange for settling, these defendants
received complete protection from future liability. Additionally, the
settlement contained a bar order, so that a non-settling defendant
would be barred from pursuing claims of contribution or indemnity
against the settling defendants. The settlement also contained
several judgment reduction provisions to credit the non-settling
defendants for the payments of the settling defendants. Specifically,
any judgment obtained against a non-settling defendant would be
reduced by the lesser of (1) the amount paid by the settling defen-
dants or (2) the proportional share of the damages attributable to
the settling defendants.' Thus, if and when a non-settling defen-
dant attempted to reduce the amount of the judgment against him,
the court would have to determine the proportional fault of the
settling parties.' Second, the settlement provided that any judg-
ment obtained against Riley would be reduced by the amount paid
by Aetna, the plans' insurer, on behalf of the trustee defendants,
i.e., $7.5 million.'30 Potentially, the settlement would also com-
pensate Riley through the Republic payment, but the parties dis-
agreed as to whether Riley's coverage under the Republic policy
extended to claims beyond those for "damages uniquely attributable
to breaches of fiduciary duty alleged to have been committed by
him in 1985..''
The Tower defendants did not agree to the settlement. Nor did
Franklin K. Riley, Jr., who served as a plan trustee in 1984 and
125. Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan and lRAP Litigation, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17234, Oct. 28, 1991 (hereinafter "Settlement"). Plaintiffs estimate the actual loss
at close to $50 million. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1023.
127. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1024.
128. Id. at 1025.
129. Id. See Settlement at *5.
130. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1024.
131. Id. at 1024-25.
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was affiliated with the plans prior to that date.3 2 Riley "has vig-
orously disputed his ERISA liability and has argued that, even if
liable his share of the blame pales in comparison to that of other
defendants.' 3 . Thus, he and his excess liability insurer, Federal
Insurance Company, appealed from the settlement order on the
grounds that it unfairly cut off their rights and potentially subjected
them to disproportionate liability."
The settlement was approved after a day-long hearing to ex-
plain how it would work, why it was favorable to the plaintiffs
and why it did not inequitably burden the non-settling defen-
dants.' Judge Broderick stated that he found the settlement to be
"fair, reasonable, and adequate."'36 The district court focused on
maximizing return to the injured plaintiffs, although Riley and his
insurer, insisting Riley had valid claims for indemnity, contribution
and malpractice, urged the court "to put fairness to Riley on an
even footing with other legitimate concerns.' 37
C. The Second Circuit's Review of the Settlement
The Second Circuit reached the conclusion that the district
court should not have approved the settlement.38 The court's con-
clusion was grounded on two issues. First, the court opined that, in
order to determine whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable and
adequate," the court must consider relative fault."3 Second, the
court directed that contribution bars were acceptable if they were
(1) narrowly tailored and (2) conform to the common law of
ERISA.' 4
To reach its conclusion, the court began by analyzing the stan-
dard of review to be used in approving or disapproving settlements.
The normal focus of a class action settlement is the plaintiff class
- is the settlement fair, reasonable and adequate as to them? 1'
However, when non-settling defendants are involved, the court
132. L. at 1024.
133. IL
134. IL at 1023.
135. Ia at 1025.
136. L This is the classic Rule 23(e) standard for approving class action settlements.
See supra note 19.
137. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1025.
138. Id at 1033.
139. IL
140. Id
141. l at 1025. See supra note 137.
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noted that their rights must also be considered.142 A compromise
that is equitable to all must be reached before the settlement can
be approved. 43 The Second Circuit determined it should review
the settlement de novo because the validity of the settlement
"rest[ed] on the determination of novel issues of ERISA law."' 44
The court next reviewed the means by which courts have at-
tempted to ensure fair distribution of damages among solvent de-
fendants, namely contribution or, in the alternative, judgment reduc-
tion by a pro rata, proportionate fault, or pro tanto method.145 As
part of the federal common law of ERISA, the court determined
that a system of proportional fault, incorporating rights to indemni-
ty and contribution, must be developed.'" The court noted, how-
ever, that the Second Circuit had not determined the scope of such
indemnity and contribution rights, nor defined the defendant's
ability to obtain them when the parties settled. 47 Masters provid-
ed the Second Circuit an opportunity to clarify these issues.
In his appeal, Riley argued that the district court should have
considered relative fault and granted a judgment reduction in an
amount at least equal to the amount of the settlement. 141 The
plaintiffs argued that the non-settling defendant could not receive
credit for any settlement amount that exceeded the proportionate
fault of the settling defendant. 149  Relying on Singer5  and
Boesky15" ' the Second Circuit ruled that "a non[-]settling defendant
whose rights against settling defendants are to be barred is entitled
to judgment reduction at least in the amount paid by all settling
parties."'52 If the court approves a fair settlement bar, then the
non-settling defendant loses the right to contribution'53 and the
right to indemnity based on differences in fault."
142. Id. at 1026.
143. Id. at 1025-26.
144. Id. at 1026. See also supra text accompanying note 101.
145. IaL at 1028-1029.
146. Id. at 1029.
147. Id. (citing Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank, 939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991)).
148. Id.
149. Id at 1029-30. The plaintiffs' argument was based on their reading of Singer v.
Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1989), and In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec.
Litig., 948 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1991). Id. at 1030.
150. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
152. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1031.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1032.
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The fairness of the settlement bar would be determined by
several factors, held the court. The bar could not be approved
unless it was (1) narrowly tailored, (2) preceded by a judicial
determination of good faith, and (3) included a judgment reduction
of no less than the amount paid by the settling defendants.'55 The
court noted that although relative fault was a crucial element in
determining the fairness of the settlement, the court could also
consider the probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial and the
adequacy of the resources of the most culpable party. 5
Based on these factors, the court reviewed the settlement ap-
proved by the district court and determined it could not stand."
The district court had not considered relative fault nor had it deter-
mined whether the settlement would compensate Riley for his lost
right of contribution because the judgment reduction amount could
have been less than that paid by the settling defendants. 8
I. ANALYsIs
The Second Circuit decision can be analyzed on three levels.
The first level considers the impact of the decision on the non-
settling defendant Riley. The second level of analysis considers the
overall logic of the court's decision, and in particular, whether the
court adequately followed Second Circuit precedent. The third level
of analysis focuses on the appropriateness of the decision in the
context of the policies underlying ERISA.
A. The Treatment of the Non-settling Defendant
Non-settling defendant Riley is the classic "bit player" of com-
plex litigation. Although he was involved with the plans, Riley did
not become a plan trustee until 1984, after the initial decision to
utilize Tower Asset as the plans' investment manager had already
been made. Relative to the other defendants, settling and non-set-
ling, Riley's culpability for the plans' participants' losses seems
minimal.
However, because ERISA provides for joint and several liabili-
ty, it is theoretically possible under the original district court theory
that if a judgment was reached against Riley, the plaintiffs could
have recovered the entire amount of their losses, estimated in ex-
155. Id. at 1031.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1032.
158. Id.
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cess of $50 million, from Riley. Absent the settlement provisions,
Riley would have sued the other defendants for contribution. And,
due to his minimal culpability, Riley would have had a strong right
of contribution. Yet, under the district court's settlement provisions,
Riley's right was extinguished, and in exchange, any judgment
against him could be reduced by some amount less than the
amount paid by the settling defendants or less than an amount
related to Riley's relative fault. However, under the Second
Circuit's one satisfaction rule, the $50 million judgment would
necessarily be reduced by the $22 million settlement, leaving a gap
of $28 million to be recovered. Thus, the amount Riley is theoreti-
cally responsible for still exceeds the amount the settling defen-
dants paid and is still in no way related to the relative fault of
Riley and the settling defendants. Obviously such an outcome is
egregiously unfair to Riley since he is left "holding the bag" for
the difference. Therefore, the Second Circuit's insistence that the
settlement be "fair" to Riley appears to have been appropriate.
However, as is evident, the Second Circuit may not have adequate-
ly addressed this concern.
B. The Judgment Reduction Method
Given that the non-settling defendant's right of contribution has
been extinguished, the Second Circuit's insistence on a "fair" set-
tlement has strong precedential and policy validity. However, the
judgment reduction rule announced by the court is not crystal clear,
combining as it does elements of the proportional fault method of
judgment reduction and the one satisfaction rule. It is unclear
whether the court is advocating a pro tanto reduction with a fair-
ness hearing as to fault, or a proportionate fault reduction with a
floor of the settling defendant's payment. The language stating the
settlement must be fair seems to imply the former, while the focus
on relative fault to determine fairness seems to imply the latter.
The court further confuses the issue by throwing in other fac-
tors beyond relative fault to assist in determining the fairness of
the settlement. First, it is not clear if the two factors mentioned by
the court - the probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial, and
the adequacy of the resources of the most culpable party - are
illustrative or exclusive. Second, the court does not clarify to what
extent these other factors would modify a determination of relative
fault. It is possible to hypothesize a scenario in which the three
factors would point to different judgment reduction methods; in
such a case, the rule does not provide a clear guideline for a court
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faced with this issue.
In reaching its decision the Masters court relied on Singer and
Boesky, noting that although those cases involved securities law
and not ERISA, it "may look to them for guidance.""5 9 However,
neither of the cases truly addressed the issue before the Second
Circuit in Masters, i.e., the appropriate judgment reduction method
in an ERISA case. Although cited as authority for the Second
Circuit's adoption of the pro tanto approach, the Singer decision
really stands for a one satisfaction rule."6 Given the court's con-
cern with fashioning the "common law of ERISA,"''6 it is
interesting to note that one court has observed that the one satis-
faction rule derives from the common law, whereas contribution is
"a statutory deviation from the common law."'' Boesky addresses
only the issue of when the decision concerning judgment reduction
must be made, and not the method itself." 3
Had the Second Circuit truly wished to rely on securities law
to inform its decision, it would have done better to turn to cases
such as In re Kaypro Corporation Litigation and United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Development Authority." In both
cases, the courts carefully reviewed how the right of contribution
developed and then weighed the pros and cons of the different
approaches to judgment reduction in light of the policies supporting
contribution and shaping securities law. Both courts persuasively
argued that the proportionate fault method was most appropriate.
The Second Circuit could also have turned to Donovan, an
ERISA decision that addressed the same issue."6 Although the
Donovan court refused to impose a bar order, shutting off the non-
settling defendant's right of contribution, its decision was based on
the adoption of comparative fault. The incentives of settlement
under each of the judgment reduction methods were carefully con-
sidered, and the court concluded comparative fault provided the
best incentives.
159. Id. at 1030.
160. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
161. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1029.
162. Kaypro, 884 F.2d 1222, 1232 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Franklin v.
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 489 U.S. 890 (1990).
163. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. Masters cites Donovan in the
context discussing third parties' rights in class action settlement, 957 F.2d at 1026, so it
is clear the Second Circuit was aware of the Donovan decision.
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In sum, the Second Circuit has made a step in the right direc-
tion by realizing that partial settlements must be fair to all parties,
not just the parties to the settlement. Yet, beyond its insistence that
relative fault be part of the fairness calculus, the court failed to
delineate exactly how fairness to all parties should be achieved. As
such, the holding of Masters is inadequate.
C. Judgment Reduction Under ERISA
The Second Circuit prefaced its de novo review of the Masters
settlement by stating that "judgment reduction affects substantive
ERISA rights and is part of pension plan regulation."1" Given
this premise and the critical importance of pension plan regulation,
the Second Circuit's decision is inadequate on additional grounds
as well.
When formulating the ERISA statutes, Congress intentionally
specified that the liability of pension plan trustees be joint and
several. This form of liability implies that the overriding concern
of the legislators was to fully compensate the participants and
beneficiaries of ERISA plans.67 It is important to recall the in-
voluntary dimension of the ERISA plaintiff's involvement. Unlike
securities litigation, the individual plaintiff here has not chosen to
enter the free-for-all brawl of the securities markets, hoping to
make a "fast buck" instead of "losing his shirt." Rather, the indi-
vidual ERISA plaintiff is fighting for his right to retire with some
modest guarantee of a dignified standard of living. As more and
more pension plans are revealed as being underfunded or defraud-
ed,"6 congressional concern is validated. By specifying joint and
several liability, the legislators perhaps intended for those involved
with such plans to monitor their own and others' involvement lest
they be forced to pay damages for an entire loss.
Congress, however, left the fashioning of a common law of
166. Masters, 957 F.2d at 1027.
167. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank, 939 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1991)
("ERISA was designed specifically to provide redress for plaintiffs - the plan's partici-
pants and beneficiaries."), cert. denied sub noma. Fairway Spring Co. v. Sovran Bank, 112
S. Ct. 3014 (1992).
168. See Albert R. Karr, Imperiled Promises: Risk to Retirees Rises as Firms Fail to
Fund Pensions They Offer, WAU ST. J., Feb. 4, 1993, at Al, A12. See also J. Robert
Suffoletta, Jr., Note, Who Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?:
A Strategy for Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 308 (1990)
(arguing that a comprehensive strategy should include RICO charges against fiduciaries
and pursuit of nonfiduciaries such as accountants, attorneys and solvent officers and direc-
tors).
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ERISA to the courts and thus, a right of contribution among the
co-trustees has been judicially implied. Given that the courts have
fashioned such a right, they must now be willing to protect the
right and deal equitably with the competing interests of plaintiffs,
settling defendants, and non-settling defendants. Yet, because the
ERISA plaintiff has not voluntarily placed his assets at risk, the
dependence on admiralty and securities law to formulate an ERISA
judgment reduction rule may not be appropriate. In the case of
ERISA, to correspond to the underlying legislative objectives it
seems that the court's primary objective in approving or disapprov-
ing a settlement should be compensation of the plaintiffs' injuries.
Thus, the pro tanto method of judgment reduction has a certain
intuitive appeal where the specified liability is joint and sever-
al."6 However, if the right of contribution is cut off, the assess-
ment of judgment reduction methods must be altered to include
compensation for the lost right. Given that the objective of plaintiff
compensation is met, however, it is imperative that the interests of
the settling and non-settling defendants be treated equally. The
proportionate fault method seems to be the only method that meets
all of the competing objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Masters is illustrative of the
problems courts have in balancing the goals of compensation, fair-
ness and deterrence when approving or disapproving partial set-
tlements. It is important to consider the fairness of the settlement,
yet absent rigorous definition and guidelines, fairness is a hazy
judicial ideal. A court must fashion clear guidelines to ensure such
settlements are indeed fair. Although the Second Circuit attempted
to remedy the lack of fairness to the non-settling defendant, the
test it laid down is insufficiently clear to guide future decisions or
to inform the decisionmaking of future parties to a partial settle-
ment. Nor have the statutory goals of ERISA been fully served by
this decision. Full compensation of the participants can be assured,
but the wrongdoers must be treated equitably as well for the goal
of deterrence to be achieved.
At least one commentator has argued the need for a federal
169. In re VMS Limited Partnership Sec. Litig., 1991 WL 134262 at *5 (N.D. I. July
16, 1991).
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uniform contribution bar rule in securities actions.1 70 However, the
need for a uniform rule, whether statutory or judicial, extends
beyond securities law. Where federal courts have determined a
right of contribution exists, and that the right may be extinguished
by a bar order, then the courts need to fashion an equitable remedy
for the non-settling defendants whose rights are cut off. In con-
clusion, the proportionate fault method of judgment reduction
seems to best fulfill the goals of compensation, fairness and deter-
rence inherent in our justice system. This is the case even where
the underlying liability is joint and several. Therefore this should
have been the method adopted by the Second Circuit in Masters
and should be the method uniformly adopted across the country in
ERISA cases.
ANNE L. AuSTIN, PH.D.
170. See Hansen, supra note 50, at 108-11.
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